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Abstract
Network forms are often seen as models of organisational flexibility, promoting the building of trust and 
exchange  of  information  between  different  business  functions  while  offering  both  cost  savings  and 
reductions in the uncertainties usually associated with innovation. Both internal and external networks 
have been identified as key elements in the collaborative development of new products. The actual process 
of  network  building  and ongoing network  management  is  not  well  researched,  although  the  existing 
literature  highlights  difficulties  for  organisations  attempting  to  maintain  active  product  development 
networks.  This  article  examines  the development  and management  of  such a  network in  the defence 
industry and focuses on network building processes in terms of the interactions between the individuals 
involved. This network has endured and evolved over many years despite a series of conflicts. One of the 
key findings  is  that  the  effective  functioning  of  the  overall  network  is  closely allied  to  established 
processes within the two participating firms.
Key Words
Innovation  Networks,  New  Product  Development,  Organisational  Politics,  Network  Building, 
Management of Networks  
Goodwill: Conflict and Co-operation in New Product Development Networks
Introduction
The  article  begins  with  a  brief  review  of  literature  on  the  nature  of  innovation  networks,  before 
considering the challenges of managing conflict and co-operation within networks. It then focuses on a 
case study of a long-term collaboration between two firms in the defence industry. One firm is based in the 
UK, the other in the USA and they are jointly developing state-of-the-art electronic receivers. The nature 
of innovation networks is examined through the study of their relationship going back some 15 years 
between firstly, internal and external networks and secondly, formal and informal network modes. The 
connection between network success and organisational growth is considered in the light of possibilities 
for long-term learning and adaptation. One of the key findings is that the effective functioning of the 
overall  network is closely allied to the dynamic interactions within and between the two participating 
firms.
The  methodology employed  in  researching  the  case  presented  here  involved  over  thirty  face-to-face 
interviews with network participants from both sites, over a eighteen month period. The generous level of 
access to employees across a range of functions and hierarchical levels  enabled the construction of a 
detailed case biography encompassing a wide range of perspectives. Accounts from individuals who had 
been involved in the network virtually from the time of its creation, together with accounts from people 
who had joined more recently, ensured that  a  thorough analysis  of  the factors  affecting learning and 
change within the network could be undertaken.
The Nature of Innovation Networks
There is a growing interest in investigating the function of networks in innovation. One strand of thought 
has  considered  the  role  of  internal  networks  in  technological  development,  and  had  focussed  on  the 
flexibilities  intrinsic  to  this  form  of  organisation  enabling  the  firm  to  respond  to  rapidly  changing 
conditions  [1].  The  literature  identifies  factors  such  as  improved  communication  between  different 
business  functions  [2],  effective  new  product  development  through  alliance-building  [3],  and 
organisational learning as positive outcomes of networking  [4]. Other writers, however, not only look at 
the positive role networks play in the innovation process, but also at the restrictions and contingencies they 
may impose  [5].   For  example,  embedded and increasingly dysfunctional  networks  [6],  resistance  to 
change [7]and poor information sharing across the networks [8] have been identified as critical problem 
areas .  Coombs and Hall  (1998)  suggest that  both formal  and informal  networks  are  involved in  the 
effective diffusion and utilisation of organisational knowledge throughout the firm, raising the issue of 
possible ‘legitimate’ routes of information flow [9].
In addition, the implications of external alliances and networks for innovation have been analysed in terms 
of cost  savings [10],  control  of technological  uncertainties [11]  and knowledge capture from external 
sources [12].  Small, highly innovative firms in particular, may rely on 'flexible specialisation' [13] , which 
makes external networking essential to their survival [14]. Informal external networks have been identified 
as critical in knowledge sharing processes [15] and the generation of new ideas [16].  Lundgren (1995) has 
shown that embedded external networks can inhibit changes between customers and suppliers [17], while 
other risks have been identified for small and medium sized firms, including imbalances of power[18], 
loss  of  technological  'know-how'  [19],  increased  network  dependency,  and  resource  demands  [20]. 
Hakansson  and  Johanson  (1988)  noted,  however,  that  technical,  legal  and  social  bonds  can  develop 
between network participants which can help to stabilise external linkages [21].
Some writers have shown the dependence of innovative firms on both internal and external networks to 
facilitate a complex programme of new product developments [22].  Such networks may be formal  or 
informal in nature, or a even a combination of both. Informal networks are characterised by information 
exchanges between individuals based on social exchange, for example overlapping areas of interest or 
concern whether professional or personal. Formal networks, however, typically involve cross-functional 
communications  between  representatives  from  different  departments  or  from  their  respective 
organisations. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) draw attention to this distinction in roles between formal 
representation and informal, interpersonal interactions within networks and also point out that both types 
of interaction are important in building trust and co-operation between network participants [23]. Other 
writers have also noted an relationship between formal and informal network processes [24]. 
It can be seen from the above discussion that much of the literature has identified the effects of networks 
on innovation in terms of either facilitating or obstructing the process of technological development. Less 
attention  has  been  paid  to  the  factors  which  impact  on  the  actual  network  building  processes  [25]. 
However, the process of network building is a politicised activity with key interest groups influencing co-
operative  and  conflictive  agendas,  and  investigating  the  role  of  negotiation  in  creating  and  shaping 
management decisions may expose areas of vulnerability in inter-organisational innovation projects. As 
Eld and Johansson (1997) observe, ‘powerful firms exploit their network position to obtain favourable 
conditions of exchange’ [26].  Pfeffer (1992) highlights the role of power in influencing organisational 
behaviours through the interdependence of disparate groups, creation of coalitions and the development of 
communication networks [27]. Morgan (1997) attempts to explain conflicting objectives and interests of 
individuals as they seek to affect the outcomes of organisational change, by that loose networks of people 
will  ‘co-operate  in  relation  to  specific  issues,  events  or  decisions  or  to  advance  specific  values  and 
ideologies’[28]. Dawson (1994) considers the political nature of change and the actions of ‘change agents' 
in terms of the social construction of past decisions and their implementation [29]. The competence and 
expertise required in building and maintaining innovation networks depends on the capacity of managers 
to confront and resolve issues arising from the interactions between network members, and such activity 
highlights the ability of management to shape organisational outcomes of technological change. Termed 
the 'process agenda' by Buchanan and Body (1992), such negotiation is illustrated in the case study that 
follows [30].
A key dynamic of network development therefore, appears to be the desire to advance and defend self-
interests on the part of the participants. In the case study that follows, it  will be argued that effective 
product development has relied on changing aspects of network organisation. It appears that successful 
product development through an inter-firm network may be constantly under threat from changes to the 
internal organisation in both firms.  While  the nature and characteristics of the product developed are 
specified  down  to  the  finest  detail  by  the  customer,  it  is  contended  here  that  the  success  of  the 
development  process  is  highly  dependent  on  various  levels  of  interaction  between  the  network 
participants.  Furthermore, the longitudinal nature of this case helps to illustrate more dynamic aspects of 
the processes involved in network building and its management.
The Case Study 
The case consists of two firms working in the defence industry which have been collaborating since 1985 
over the development of receiver technology that forms part of military communications systems. The 
network  is  composed  of  representatives  of  different  business  functions  in  the  two  firms,  though  its 
composition does not stay constant as both the departmental and individual roles in the network change 
over time. There exists a formal agreement over the collaboration, within which two contract teams are 
involved in putting together project bids while engineers in both firms fulfil specific development tasks 
involving a significant amount of knowledge transfer. The UK firm is well established in the UK defence 
electronics market as part of a electronics group consisting of 12 firms based in the UK and the USA. One 
division (referred to here as HCo) maintains a network-based innovation strategy through the development 
of technological collaborations with other firms [31]. The initial collaboration with a small firm in the 
USA (referred to here as FCo) was an early example of this partnering strategy, and is now one of the 
longest running on-going collaborative projects in which the two firms are involved.  The network under 
study, therefore, consists of employees in both firms interacting both at formal and informal levels.
As  early  as  1985  senior  managers  at  HCo  first  approached  FCo  with  a  proposal  for  collaboration. 
Development work undertaken at FCo at the time related to the production of electronic receivers for the 
US Navy.  HCo was keen to utilise this expertise to reduce its own costs in developing a similar product 
for the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), while FCo would not have been able to bid for participation in a 
MoD contract without a suitable UK partner. Initially a HCo management team was sent into FCo to 
assess the facilities and production quality standards, and it was sufficiently impressed to offer a licence 
fee in exchange for the technical information and specialist assistance required to develop the product in 
the UK. HCo had experience in supplying avionics equipment for helicopters and knowledge of the UK 
defence  market  that  was  instrumental  in  the  partnership  winning  the  MoD  contract  despite  strong 
competition.  The two firms implemented a manufacturing licensing agreement to cover limitations on 
territory as well as sort out the 'work share' arrangements. By teaming with FCo, HCo was able to reduce 
its own product development costs while the arrangement gave UK market access to a small US firm, so 
managers from both sides expected mutual benefits to accrue from this partnering arrangement. 
HCo / FCo Partnership - the Early Years
A good working relationship developed in the early stages, and HCo was able to spread its costs further by 
delivering  similar  products  under  other  contracts  alongside  the  work  with  FCo.  However,  cultural 
differences in the way business is done in the US and the UK caused some difficulties in day to day 
dealings between the two firms, as did some clashes between individuals. Effective working relationships 
that  did develop often lacked continuity due to  periodic  changes in  responsibility and staff  turnover. 
Organisationally, FCo was perceived to be poorly run, had a bad record in meeting deadlines and delivery, 
and was also working within very tight financial constraints. Communications between the  two firms 
became  more  fraught  as  time  went  on.  These  operational  difficulties  led  to  increasing  friction  and 
acrimony between them, because HCo incurred the wrath of the ultimate customer for late deliveries or 
technical problems. Very soon, HCo felt that the US firm had too relaxed an attitude to both deadlines and 
contractual requirements, and this caused problems for UK engineers who spent a considerable time in 
ensuring the technology met the detailed specifications in the highly specific contract from the MoD. 
A  major  problem emerged  when  FCo was  subsequently  taken  over  by another  US  firm  and  a  new 
management team was put in place. The new Chief Executive Officer opposed the collaboration and  one 
of his first acts was to remove the Marketing Officer who had initiated the collaboration with HCo. In 
addition, a number of other key employees left, including some of the engineers involved in development 
of the receiver technology.  Meanwhile, FCo's contract to supply the receiver in the US (the design of 
which was the basis  of the joint  MoD project  in the UK) was re-tendered by the US Department  of 
Defence (DoD) [32].  Thinking that this was just a contingency plan, FCo managers suggested that HCo 
should also bid for the ‘second source’ contract as they preferred the idea of sharing the business with a 
known firm. But changed federal contractual terms gave rise to a situation where  the two  firms ended up 
competing head-to-head for the business, which not surprisingly caused some friction.  FCo won this 
business  but  internal  management  problems  contributed  to  an  over-commitment  of  resources  and 
consequently the firm's already precarious financial problems were exacerbated. 
As a result of this experience, the fragile relationship between FCo and HCo broke down completely, with 
HCo quite sure that its bid had contributed to the developing problems of the other firm. This bid had also 
given HCo the impetus to put more resources into its own internal technological developments and this 
effort to rival the erstwhile partner had gone some way to make up its earlier technical deficiency. But it 
also illustrated to HCo the vast level of investment in terms of cost and technical resources that would be 
needed to continue development of its own version of the receiver. Nevertheless, two different versions of 
the technology were  now a distinct  possibility.   Staff  interviewed at  HCo recalled an  atmosphere  of 
increasing frustration at the unreliability of FCo and the damage caused by competing with them was 
regarded  as  the  final  straw,  even  though  some  parts  of  the  complex  network  were  still  functioning 
cordially. FCo, however, was preoccupied with continuing organisational and financial problems. 
The Path to Takeover
By the early 1990s, FCo had started to develop a new generation of its receiver technology, and  HCo was 
keen to gain access to the new development. They felt FCo was considerably ahead of any comparable 
technology worldwide including their own and co-operation would be essential in bidding for another 
proposed MoD project.  However, there were worries about the headstrong nature of the CEO at FCo 
whose management style was perceived to be, ‘uncontrollable’.  Because of the acrimonious ending of the 
earlier relationship and the breakdown of trust between the firms, HCo was very cautious when entering 
into partnership negotiations again in 1996, so much so that the whole contract team was sent on a course 
to  develop  their  negotiating  skills  in  advance.  FCo  was  still  perceived  as  technically  excellent, 
organisationally poor, financially weak, and habitually late in delivery. Consequently a new partnership 
was regarded as a major risk but if the US firm reneged on a new agreement, HCo felt it would be in a 
stronger  position  than  in  the  1980s  when  it  did  not  have  the  in-house  expertise  to  cope  with  the 
technology. It was clear that resurrecting the alliance was a  'necessary evil' and therefore contingencies 
would have to be built into the relationship to allow for expected delays and missed deadlines on the part 
of FCo. 
However, despite the expectations that a mutually acceptable agreement between the firms might not be 
possible, negotiations turned out to be less fraught than expected and an memorandum of understanding 
was quickly signed, as HCo was also able to bail FCo out of severe financial difficulties at that time. The 
re-formed partnership was awarded another MoD contract in early 1997.
The renewed collaboration was taken a stage further a few months later when the HCo group took over 
FCo. According to HCo, the idea of purchasing the US firm stemmed from the perceived need to control 
'loose cannons' within FCo’s management structure, who had contributed to the relationship breakdown. 
Interviewees from FCo claimed that their senior management had approached HCo at the Farnborough Air 
Show seeking a 'white knight' because the financial position had become so grave that the company may 
well  have otherwise gone into receivership.  HCo would also have then lost  its  newly resurrected US 
partner and the lucrative MoD contract would have been placed in jeopardy. The relationship could also 
have been doomed if FCo had been taken over by a hostile firm. The $13 million deal was concluded in 
May 1997 and FCo now operates as an HCo subsidiary. A condition of the deal was the departure of the 
unpopular CEO [33]. HCo also insisted on one of its own senior managers being permanently based at the 
US firm's offices, although his influence is somewhat restricted due a special security agreement (SSA) 
enforced by the US government because of FCo's access to classified material. This tightly regulates the 
contact between FCo and HCo personnel, causing considerable operational difficulties at all levels. Hence 
despite its ownership of FCo, HCo has only very limited knowledge of the nature of its business with other 
US firms [34]. 
Operational Implications of the Take-over
Respondents  at  FCo  openly  acknowledged  that  their  firm  had  tended  to  act  in  an  impulsive  and 
undisciplined way in the past,  leading to  a poor business reputation,  and that the arrival of HCo had 
brought  much-needed  stability  and  organisation.  HCo,  with  its  conservative  attitudes  and  firm  cost 
controls,  now brought  in a sense of  commitment  and customer focus to  FCo. This   policy is  greatly 
admired in FCo, and many of the employees interviewed claimed that the atmosphere in the firm was now 
less frantic and it was a much more friendly place to work. They described how several key staff - who had 
left  the firm in frustration with the idiosyncratic CEO - had now rejoined and could not  believe the 
transformation. 
HCo has a very traditional culture with a hierarchical management structure that accords respect to length 
of service and educational achievement. One FCo interviewee was impressed by the efficiency and evident 
success of the UK operation, but he claimed that he always 'had to be on my best behaviour' when visiting 
the UK. In contrast, FCo is more informal, with everyone on first name terms and an 'open door' policy 
extending right to the top of the organisation [35].  FCo staff are impressed when they phone the UK in 
their afternoon and people are still at work, late into the UK night. Conversely some HCo staff perceive 
FCo  staff  to  be  idle  because  they  would  phone  at  6pm  US  time  and  no  one  would  be  there.  An 
undercurrent of resentment was evident in some of the more junior HCo employees, that FCo staff have a 
'better deal' and go home early leaving HCo to sort out their mistakes.  After visiting both firms, it is 
apparent that FCo staff start very early and work through without a break, whereas HCo staff start later in 
the day, have a long lunch break, and then stay on later in the evening. The strategy of sending a senior 
manager out from the UK for a two year period to manage the relationship helped to smooth over the 
cultural differences between the firms. The idea was that FCo would then be equipped to operate on its 
own as an HCo subsidiary after this trial period [36]. 
Some operational differences still persist. Testing of new systems is one such area. In the UK it is more 
extensive and linked to future production problems with an attempt to iron out any potential problems at 
an early stage. In the US testing is regarded as part of engineering and completed before production is 
involved. These unresolved divisions between the two engineering sites has left this section of the inter-
firm network  dissatisfied  with  the  level  and type of  communication,  and  the  UK engineers,  at  least, 
believe, 'if we had not bought FCo, everything would have been cut and dried in terms of responsibilities -  
now it’s all blurred'.  Some staff commented that FCo's emphasis upon speed of production to enhance 
short-term cash flow compromised the ultimate quality of  the product.  So there still  appears to be a 
tendency to blame the US firm for production problems that occur.
Within HCo some believe that FCo employees might well perceive the take-over as a personal threat and 
be suspicious of collaborating with HCo staff. Consequently many HCo staff appeared sympathetic and 
willing to tolerate teething problems while allowing time for bridges to be built  and a degree of trust 
established.  One HCo manager felt that this factor could explain why FCo was reluctant to hand over any 
more than the minimum technical information. Some HCo employees reported that they had established a 
good working relationship with their counterparts, and they also noted how the time difference between 
the  US  and  UK  helps  in  turning  queries  around  quickly  and  hence  improved  productivity.  At  the 
operational  level,  the  HCo employees  have  seen  the  earlier  customer/supplier  relationship  change  to 
something more collegiate where all the staff ultimately work for the same boss. Staff from both firms 
acknowledged that synergies were developing as a result of the two sets of engineers working closely 
together.  It  is  widely  recognised  that  HCo  is  better  at  concepts,  while  FCo  is  more  skilled  in  the 
operational detail, and this variable is now being exploited for mutual benefit.
The senior management team at HCo consider it to be more difficult to manage the relationship now than 
before FCo was purchased. Some interviewees from FCo admitted that they tend to be more casual about 
deadlines now that  HCo is  no longer  a customer,  and therefore give priority to  other,  more pressing 
projects. HCo staff felt that it was difficult to ascertain what progress FCo is making, because its staff 
often appears to be cagey about sharing information about the extent of other commitments. One felt that 
confidentiality was used as an excuse to keep HCo out of the development stage, and asserted that FCo 
engineers are secretive, competitive and just trying to protect themselves by keeping as much work as 
possible.  The FCo engineers complained that  they had no specific  'road map'  to  work to  on the UK 
contract now that they were part of the HCo group rather than an independent supplier. They claimed that 
the lack of clear guidelines sometimes led to operational difficulties, but at the same time they were glad 
that HCo was too far away to interfere too much in their day-to-day activities. 
They also realised that FCo could benefit financially from the new ownership structure. This is because it 
is now in HCo's interest to pay FCo promptly for work done, thereby improving the US firm's financial 
position. FCo is therefore in an unique position because it is effectively reporting to its biggest customer. 
While HCo wants FCo to be profitable, hence remaining a secure source of supply and justifying the 
decision to purchase, at the same time it wants to minimise the cost of the product at the UK end. Whilst 
acknowledging the  greater  rigour  that  the  HCo approach has  brought  to  their  operations,  some FCo 
interviewees were resentful of the degree of interest HCo showed in the detail of their business. In the 
words of one engineer, 
'I wish we could just say “trust us, we are the experts”. But they always make us feel that we have  
got something to prove, and cannot be trusted. I guess that goes back a long way though’.
The current position is that development for the MOD is well underway and the relationship between FCo 
and HCo is improving at the operational level. The original arrangement when the relationship between 
the firms was restored  was that  production  for  US contracts  would  take  place  in  the  USA, and UK 
contracts  would  be  produced  in  the  UK.  However,  FCo  has  recently  been  charged  with  product 
development for the MOD contract due to spare capacity. This decision was taken after a protracted delay 
and caused considerable ill feeling and fears over job security at HCo. In particular they fear the slippage 
of deadlines affecting time available for the final testing stage, for which the UK team have to plan and 
build required facilities, and would like to incorporate a range of features that experience has shown, will 
be  necessary.  The passage of  time means that  fewer  staff  are  aware  of  the  chequered history of  the 
relationship and many of the main protagonists are no longer involved. Conflict between the firms is now 
internalised following the purchase of FCo, and its continuance can only be detrimental to the performance 
of the Group as a whole. It appears that FCo is well on the way to being absorbed into the HCo group, and 
its staff have job security and a constructive working environment for the first time in many years. The 
problem for HCo now centres upon the degree of resources that have to be devoted to managing the 
relationship with FCo and the increasing number of other partner firms around the world. It is recognised 
within  the  firm that  the  task  is  becoming increasingly onerous  as  the  firm grows,  and  this  issue  is 
discussed in the next section.
Discussion: The Role of Network Building Processes
It  has  been  suggested elsewhere  [31]  that  HCo has  developed a  sophisticated  expertise  in  long term 
management  of  inter-firm  boundaries  in  response  to  its  own  extensive  network  of  technological 
collaborations.  It  appears  that  HCo would  rather  take  on  the  task  of  managing  an  uncertain  partner 
boundary situation by developing high level negotiating skills, in preference to developing an in-house 
expertise which could result  in the problem of creating what more than one respondent referred to as 
engineering ‘idle time’. In other words, staff who are under-occupied during quiet periods are generally 
seen within the firm as a waste of resources and investment. In addition, HCo has failed to find any other 
comparable technology elsewhere and become dependent on the FCo receiver technology. Purchasing FCo 
was therefore essential to safeguard access to expertise when it appeared that the firm might have been in 
danger  of  bankruptcy  or  hostile  takeover.  The  question  has  been  posed  whether  network  forms  of 
association are enduring, or merely a prelude to takeover [37].  It is evident that the reasons for takeover in 
this case (as opposed to the many other long-term alliances with other firms managed by HCo) is that the 
expertise provided by FCo had become part of HCo's necessary core competence [38] because of their 
reluctance to develop an independent in-house technology. From HCo's perspective, the firm has now 
internalised the expertise necessary to maintain a leading position in the world market. In the words of one 
manager,
'This has been bread and butter business for us for the past 25 years, and there is no way we could  
have done it alone. I know there have been problems with FCo in the past...and no doubt mistakes  
by both sides, but hopefully we've all learnt something from it.' 
From the point of view of FCo, despite the well documented vulnerabilities of small firms with respect to 
collaboration and the dangers of takeover, this solution appears to have brought organisational benefits 
and saved it from a hostile takeover. The two engineering sites, however, appear to have very different 
views of the necessity for network interaction. HCo engineers now feel undervalued and threatened by the 
decision to site production at FCo, particularly as the work is for a UK contract. Despite this vote of 
confidence in FCo, the instances of suspicion and secrecy described earlier may indicate that similar fears 
are  also  prevalent  amongst  the  US engineers.  The  UK engineers  are  forced  to  wait  for  a  completed 
development stage in the US before their own role in the project can begin. Not surprisingly, they would 
relish an opportunity to engage in earlier, open exchanges with the other site.  In one sense, however, the 
uneasy relationship must be seen as a product of the chequered history of the technical centres within the 
two firms, as ingrained competition is still evident. 
Inter-firm collaborations set up a complex network of interactions between the staff employed in the two 
firms, both at the formal and informal levels. This case study illustrates the many complexities involved in 
the analysis of the role of networks in new product development. The literature on this subject may appear 
contradictory in terms of identifying the costs and benefits associated with network forms of organisation. 
This case helps to focus on the relationships and processes involved in building and maintaining such a 
network  over  time,  and  aspects  of  persisting  co-operation  and  conflict.   Although  the  collaboration 
between the two firms was initiated in terms of expected mutual benefits, operational difficulties soon 
emerged  which  were  exacerbated  to  the  point  of  breakdown by the  first  take  over  of  FCo  and  the 
introduction of a hostile CEO. Formal breakdown at this level resulted in a loss of access to the technology 
for  HCo  and  led  to  the  duplication  of  technology due  to  continued  development  in-house  at  HCo. 
However, informal co-operation and information sharing between the two contract teams persisted during 
this  time,  indicating that  co-operative networking processes,  where there is  established trust  and high 
levels of mutual interest amongst certain particular groups, is not easy to curtail. 
Senior managers at HCo continued to require strategic access to the FCo technology and in the difficult 
situation  that  ensued,  they realised  that  a  new tight  formal  agreement  was  essential  to  protect  their 
interests, to the extent of sending staff for formal training in contract negotiation. It transpired, however, 
that the financial strength of HCo was a crucial factor in the continuation of the collaboration and in HCo's 
ability to direct their acquisition of the US firm. While this move resulted in securing the technology for 
HCo and solving the problem of access at senior management level, there were on-going conflicts between 
employees at other levels. Suspicion and jealousies seemed to exist over perceived 'better' employment 
benefits in the USA, while the persistent lack of trust and communication between the engineers appears 
to be a long-term problem. This indicates that informal conflicts in network processes are also difficult to 
manage and resolve when accompanied by mistrust  and a lack of  communication.  Furthermore,  such 
conflicts can arise at any point or level in the network. 
The  progress  in  network  interactions  in  this  case  illustrates  a  number  of  points  with  respect  to  the 
development of inter-firm relationships. Disruptions at senior management level can result in a breakdown 
of formal relationships between the two firms, but the split is not necessarily irretrievable providing both 
firms have overlapping interests over which they wish to renegotiate. Even so, past conflict undermined 
trust  and the terms of the new formal  agreement  reflected this  by establishing new boundaries.  Even 
though there had been a formal breakdown in one part of network, however, it had not led to the severing 
of all informal interactions, as demonstrated by the continual exchange of information between the two 
contract teams during this period. This implies that a complex network is not controllable from one focal 
point.  Indeed, both co-operation and conflict can persist throughout any difficult periods of change in the 
network. Such evidence indicates a blurring of Ring and Van de Ven’s [23] distinction between formal 
and informal interactions in networks, by suggesting that informal interactions can develop out of formal 
business links and informal processes can and do affect formal business behaviour. Furthermore, the case 
also provides evidence that both entrenched co-operative and conflicting informal relationships can persist 
beyond the conclusion of formal links, as noted by Hakansson and Johanson [21].
In this example it is clear that changes in the network building process have affected the direction and pace 
of technological developments. The UK version of the receiver technology (as developed by HCo) was 
abandoned when the formal relationship with FCo was repaired. Consequently, the highly specified nature 
of the contract resulted in a high level of division in developmental responsibilities between the two firms, 
which in turn generated difficulties in the exchange of technical information and increased secrecy. The 
outcome of this conflict has been responsible for delay and lack of information in the UK on how the 
development is progressing. This has affected the ability at HCo to plan their own part of the contract 
responsibility, in terms of day-to-day work organisation. The major part of the innovation has been placed 
in the hands of FCo rather than in the UK technical department. A different organisation and management 
of the work such as a shared development, would have resulted in a different process of change and thus a 
different  product.  This  in  turn  illustrates  that  even  within  a  highly  deterministic  industry  structure, 
development of an inflexible, highly specified product is still susceptible to organisational influences, and 
in particular network processes. 
Changes of personnel and priorities have previously been identified as a problem area in technological 
collaboration [10].  However,  the cordial  relationship which endures at least  between the two contract 
teams can be seen partly as an outcome of the need to strike an equitable deal, and also an awareness that a 
reputation for fairness facilitates the build-up of trust. These informal relationships appear to have been 
instrumental in continuing a flow of information between the two firms even during the period where 
formal  relations  were  antagonistic  and  seem  to  have  involved  FCo  employees  prioritising  informal 
relationships  over  the  introduction  of  management  directives  to  sever  all  communication  links.  Even 
periodic  changes to  the personnel  involved on both sides has not  interrupted or  changed the friendly 
relationships that have developed in this area.
While several commentators have argued that larger firms often dominate and even shape the network to 
their own interests [10, 26], this case illustrates the changing fortunes, over time, for both the larger and 
the smaller firms. At the outset, the smaller firm with the key technology was definitely the more powerful 
partner in the relationship. However, over time, management problems left them organisationally weak 
and vulnerable, so that while HCo was technically dependent on them, it was eventually in a position to 
take  control  of  the  whole  development  process.  Thus  power  relations  were  affected  as  much by the 
dynamic balance of complementary dependencies as by firmsize. 
Conclusion
This case serves to confirm several of the issues raised in the literature in product development networks, 
considered at the beginning of this paper. Our conclusion is that conflict and co-operation can co-exist 
within a complex, dynamic network and this helps to explain why the literature identifies both benefits and 
barriers to innovation networks. In addition this case demonstrates that the formation of inter-firm product 
development networks is linked to both internal organisational and external factors. The former concerns 
such issues as strategic decision making, in-house expertise and knowledge management, while the latter 
relates, in this case, to the influence of military contracts which have pressurized the firm to seek overseas 
partners and have highly constrained technical specifications. This case clearly shows that both formal and 
informal networking processes are part of the social factors shaping the development of the technology. 
While the formal links have defined the division of technical responsibilities,  the informal links have 
influenced the access to information about the progress of the project, knowledge sharing processes and 
ultimately the ability of both parties to carry out their share of the development.
The long and turbulent history of the network studied clearly illustrates the dynamic nature of network 
relationships over time, and demonstrates the need for ongoing and active network management.  While a 
clear rationale for co-operation exists, old loyalties die hard and the spirit of competition still  endures. 
This raises questions about the possibility for the management and control of informal co-operation or 
conflict between network participants. Network processes have been influenced by ingrained aspects of 
organisational cultures, management styles and established areas of expertise.
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